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A Force Management Update



A Quarterly Newsletter of the Army Force Management School

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


DOD Seminar with UNC Institute for Defense and Business (IDB)



Background. The AFMS was recently tasked by AMC to develop and execute a one-day seminar to enhance the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) aspect of the Center of Excellence in Logistics and Technology (LOGTECH) program. AMC as the DOD Executive Agency for LOGTECH program development and implementation determined the need for a one-day seminar focusing on the roles and responsibilities of DOD. The seminar was conducted on 13 October 2005 for 17 faculty members and program officials from the University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill, Kenan-Flagler Business School, and the Institute for Defense and Business (IDB).

LOGTECH CONCEPT



Seminar Topics.

AMC in coordination with IDB program officials and the AFMS determined the need exists for the following discussion topics:

- Title 10 and Organization of DOD
- Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) and Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
- Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)
- Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)
- DOD Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Process (PPBE)
- Preamble to the Foxhole



Opening Remarks.



- The President of IDB welcomed the participants and highlighted the transformation of DOD to a force that is more deployable, more sustainable, and more dominant on the future battlefield. The military is looking to the private sector for their best practices, management skills, and technologies to help achieve this transformation. He emphasized that this seminar will help the LOGTECH faculty to have a better understanding of DOD, how it works, and what is going on today.
- LTG (Ret) Trefry, PM AFMS, emphasized the need for LOGTECHs contribution to military education, and encouraged a lasting and complementary relationship between the military, private sector, and academic communities.
- HQ AMC, the Executive Agent for LOGTECH, thanked the IDB attendees for taking the time from their schedules to attend this seminar and encouraged the participants to take this opportunity to ask questions about DOD.
- PM LOGTECH, stated that they look forward to this update and hope to realize a better understanding of their students “pains and challenges...”

Seminar Appraisals.

- “Well done!” Presentations are relevant and informative. Instructors are knowledgeable and entertaining.
- “Excellent exposure to DOD!” DOD is a complex organization and this seminar helps put the pieces of the puzzle together. Great background and context for a non-DOD instructor.
- “I have a better appreciation...” for DOD’s internal and external operating environments, their global perspective, and ongoing strategic studies.



- “Comprehensive and logical.” Appreciate the seminar source materials and websites. Great take away documents for additional research.
 - “Aggressive schedule” This is really a 2-3 day seminar to allow more time for discussions on how to apply business models to DOD practices.
 - “Heavy Context” Topics are very comprehensive and challenging.
- Follow-on Seminars: Recommended topics for future LOGTECH seminars include performance measurement metrics, readiness scorecards, risk management analysis, and the AMC Lean Six-Sigma initiative.

Summary. The primary mission of LOGTECH is to leverage global best practices and explore leading edge logistics processes, practices, and technologies. The need for collaborative education efforts such as LOGTECH and complementary relationships between the military, private sector, and academic communities will continue to grow as we transform and realign the force. Seminar participants now have a better understanding of DOD and the knowledge acquired will enhance the content and quality of the LOGTECH program.



~ T. Polmateer
~ LOGTECH Coordinator

What's an ARFORGEN?

Simply put, Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) uses resources (people, equipment, and training) to generate forces (combat-ready units) to meet current and anticipated demands of the combatant commanders. It is designed to continuously provide the Regional Combatant Commanders (RCC) full-spectrum capable forces on a rotational basis with a back-up surge capability. Operational units progress through three Force Pools (Reset/Train, Ready and Available), their resourcing and readiness based on what it is they have to be ready for. That progression is known as the operational readiness cycle. Perhaps the biggest change under ARFORGEN is that not all units will have to be ready for war all the time. Different units will have to be ready for different missions. Further, ARFORGEN recognizes that units will have to build up their readiness over time (as they progress through the operational readiness cycle) to meet specific mission demands. Equipment will be “maneuvered” between units to meet readiness requirements. The Army will change from tiered readiness to cyclical readiness.

All Brigade Combat Teams, Support Brigades, Functional Brigades, and Division/Corps will be grouped into one of three Force Pools. Numbered Army headquarters and their associated OPCON units (Theater Intelligence Brigades, Theater Network Capability Command, Theater Support Command, Civil Affairs, and Combat Arms) remain non-rotational, non-force pool units.


FORCE POOLS

The Force Pools are:

1. **Reset/Train:** The initial ARFORGEN Force Pool includes modular units that redeploy from long term operations, are directed to reset/train, or are experiencing significant personnel and/or equipment changes or reorganization and are unable to sustain Ready or Available Force capability levels. Reset/Train begins at R-Day, usually associated with leadership transitions. R-Day is recommended by FORSCOM, approved by HQDA, with the date established by official order. Active Component (AC) units will probably stay in the Reset/Train pool six to nine months, while Reserve Component (RC) units will probably stay up to four years.
2. **Ready:** The second Force Pool includes those modular units assessed as “Ready” at designated capability levels (from training and readiness “gates”) to conduct mission preparation and higher-level collective training with other operational headquarters. They are eligible for sourcing, may be mobilized if required, and can be trained, equipped, resourced and committed if necessary to meet operational (surge) requirements. Units in the Ready Force Pool are designated for either a Ready Expeditionary Forces (REF) Package or Deployment Expeditionary Forces (DEF) Package. The REF consists of task organized units, under a higher headquarter’s control (HICON), designated to train/prepare for potential operational requirements or task organized to best execute full spectrum training. The DEF in the Ready Pool consists of task-organized units designed to execute planned operational requirements. REF units focus on OPLAN-specific METL tasks while DEF units focus on theater-specific METL tasks. During their time in the Ready Pool, units initially designated in the REF may be resourced and redesignated to the DEF to meet surge requirements.
3. **Available:** The third force pool includes those modular units which have been assessed as “Available” at designated capability levels (from training and readiness “gates”) to conduct mission execution under any RCC. All AC and RC units will pass through a one-year Available Force Pool window. AC units are available for immediate deployment and RC units are available for alert/mob/required post-mob training and validation/deployment. At the end of their respective Available Force Pool time, all units return to the Reset/Train Force Pool. Units in the Available Force Pool are designated for either a DEF Package or Contingency Expeditionary Force (CEF) Package. The CEF Package consists of Available Force Pool units, not in a DEF, task organized to meet operational plans

and contingency requirements. These forces are capable of rapid deployment but are not yet alerted to deploy (AC) or alerted for mobilization (RC). CEF forces will transition into DEF(s) if alerted. Generally, AC forces will rotate through the Available Pool one in every three years while RC force will rotate through the Available Pool one in every six years. These cycles may be shortened for low-density type units or to meet RCCs' operational demands.

Requirements-Based Construct



ARFORGEN Synchronization.

FORSCOM conducts the ARFORGEN Synchronization Conference semi-annually starting this fall. It consists of four sequential segments: Sourcing, Training, Resourcing, and Outbrief. The Sourcing Segment identifies and prioritizes known requirements; builds/refines force packages and assigns units to force pools. The Training Segment prioritizes and synchronizes training with training enablers. The results of Sourcing and Training segments cause the Resource Segment to produce outputs such as manning plans and priorities, equipping schedules, information technology (IT) schedules, schools, contracting schedules, training enabler support, and funding requirements. The ARFORGEN Synchronization Conference concludes with an out brief to the FORSCOM Commander and other principal stakeholders to outline how requirements were prioritized, sourced, and resourced. Final results provide senior leadership a foundation for allocation of resources necessary to provide forces and capabilities to meet the Army's operational requirements. Results are codified in orders and set the conditions for subordinate unit training briefs.

Conclusion

ARFORGEN is codified in Change 2 to the Army Campaign Plan. AR 71-32 (Force Development) and AR 220-1 (Unit Status Reporting) will reflect changes caused by ARFORGEN. Both regulations are projected to be published next year. Additionally, ARFORGEN will potentially provide input to the requirements phase of Total Army Analysis as unit-type (Source Requirement Code) requirements are identified for the REF and the DEF.

Under ARFORGEN, not all units will be ready all the time. ARFORGEN takes units through increasing levels of readiness over time to meet the current and anticipated needs of the RCCs. It does so by synchronizing

the phased application of resources to generate units to meet those needs. At the same time it increases the predictability of unit rotations, benefiting soldiers.

~ Richard Ledbetter
~ David Retherford

ACTION OFFICER LOGISTICS COURSE

On 7 October 2005, the Army Force Management School graduated their most recent session of the Action Officer Logistics Course (AOLC). This one week course educates and trains the student about current Defense and Army logistics agencies, their goals, policies, processes and systems; and prepares the student to execute and manage logistics staff officer functions. It provides in-depth logistics management education and training and is intended to meet the needs of field grade military logisticians (Majors, Lieutenant Colonels, and Colonels) and their civilian counterparts (GM/GS 12, 13, 14, and 15) on the staffs of the Army Staff/Secretariat, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, Defense Logistics Agency and the Army Materiel Command.

In addition to providing updated information on the organization and functions of the principal defense logistics organizations and their activities, specific focus is placed on the transformation of the Defense Department and the U.S. Army in particular. The Current Force, with the modular Brigade Combat Team reorganization and the ARFORGEN model of force generation, is covered, followed by an examination of the plan for later transition to the Future Force. Logistics transformation and the role of logistics automation in the overall defense and Army realignment and modernization are covered in detail. The roles of the institutional processes, which provide the framework for the execution, and management of the transformation and their continually changing functions are discussed. These include (1) Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) in which required war fighting capabilities are identified and comprehensively developed, (2) the Defense Acquisition System which provides the basis for acquiring capabilities that include materiel as part, and (3) the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process which provides the management decision framework for allocating enabling resources across the Department of Defense.

Headquarters, Department of the Army, G-4, sponsors the course and the most recent class was the fifth in a series that began in October 2002. A total of 134 students have attended in the series. Student evaluations for all classes have been very positive. Specific comments on the most recent student appraisal sheets included: "This course is well put together with very knowledgeable instructors and the instructors are very thoughtful..." "All blocks of instruction have great impact and will assist most persons with their position if they apply at will..." "Overall – an exceptional course and great new resource base," and "This info is great – don't get rid of any of it."

Two sessions of the AOLC are tentatively scheduled in FY2006: 27 March – 3 April 2006 and 31 July – 4 August 2006. Enrollment is managed by the HQDA G-4, Center for Strategy and Integration. Individuals interested in attending should contact Ms. Ernie Fields, 703-614-2194, DSN 224-2194, and email at ernestine.fields@hqda.army.mil.

~ Al Hutton
AOLC Course Director

The Utilization of Federal Military Forces in Natural or Manmade Disasters in the United States and U.S. Territories

(Posse Comitatus and the Insurrection Act)

As a result of Hurricane Katrina, the use of federal military forces in major disasters, natural or manmade, has received significant attention. President Bush speaking from New Orleans in the aftermath of Katrina stated "It is now clear that a challenge on this scale requires greater federal authority and a broader role for the armed forces." Senator Warner, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, took the lead in Congress and forwarded a request to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to conduct a Department of Defense review of the Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. § 1385) and its restriction on employing federal forces for law enforcement as well as a review of all statutes controlling presidential authority to utilize federal forces in circumstances like Katrina. Other congressional members have joined Senator Warner calling for the legislation review and recommendations on appropriate amendments to enhance the President's authority in this area.

There are those, however, who believe that current law provides ample presidential authority under appropriate circumstances to employ federal forces for law enforcement or otherwise in the states and territories. In their view, current law provides the proper distribution between federal and state authority for Katrina like catastrophes. They argue that increased federal power in this area jeopardizes the delicate balance between federalism and state rights and, therefore, it would be extremely unwise to modify an already weakened by exception Posse Comitatus Act or other existing statutes. In other words, the executive branch has all the express authority it requires and what is really needed is efficient, coordinated, interagency employment of that authority.

Attempting to resolve the issues raised above requires the determination and examination of existing law that governs. Since federal and states rights are at the core of the matter, the starting point for this scrutiny is the fundamental charter establishing that relationship, the Constitution of the United States. Unfortunately, the law from this primary source of authority is less than clear. Article II, Powers of the Executive, does not provide explicit authority for the President to use federal military forces in situations like Katrina. There is an argument, however, that such authority exists implicitly in the designation of the President as the Commander in Chief of federal forces and responsible to "... take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed ...". Another inference of implied Presidential power in this area can be found in Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution which imposes the duty on the United States to "... protect each (State) of them against ... domestic violence" when requested by the state legislature or, in the absence of the legislature, the governor.

Since the Constitution does not provide clear, specific power for presidential employment of federal forces in circumstances like Katrina, the next line of inquiry is the United States Code. Here the Congress has acted and provided very specific legal authority for use of federal forces in domestic or civil disturbances. Title 10 U.S.C. § 331-335, collectively referred to as the Insurrection Act, permits the President to employ federal forces in a state or territory at the request of the legislature (or Governor, if the legislature cannot be convened), without legislative or gubernatorial request, if it is determined that federal law cannot be enforced, and even over objection of the state or territory when United States' citizens are denied equal protection of the laws or execution of federal law is challenged or obstructed. There is considerable precedence supporting presidential use of these statutes or similar authority as well as inherent constitutional powers of the President. From 1807 to 1925 federal military forces were employed over 100 times to resolve civil disturbances. More recently, in 1992 federal troops were used in California to quell rioting following the acquittal verdicts of law enforcement personnel in the Rodney King incident.

Arguably therefore, inherent presidential authority in the Constitution and the specific authority of the Insurrection Act provide the President ample legal justification to employ federal forces in situations analogous to that of

Katrina. Furthermore, the Posse Comitatus Act by virtue of its constitutional and statutory authorization exceptions is not a bar to action under those disaster circumstances. Posse Comitatus is a limitation on the utilization of federal troops for law enforcement, not a total preclusion of their use. This delicate balance between the restricted use and authorized use of federal forces in the area of law enforcement is recognized and supported by the United States Congress. A November 2002 "Sense of Congress reaffirming the continued importance and applicability of the Posse Comitatus Act", 6 U.S.C. § 466, simultaneously concluded that the Posse Comitatus Act is an appropriate limitation on law enforcement by federal forces and that the President has ample legal authority to employ federal troops to reestablish and maintain law and order during a crisis situation.

Note: Sources for the above include news articles (see "Senator asks pentagon to revisit ban on military's domestic police powers", Megan Scully, Congress Daily, September 15, 2005, "Officials consider quicker federalization, use of military in disaster response", Chris Strohm, GOVEXEC.com, September 20, 2005, and "Pentagon begins review of law on military's domestic role", Megan Scully, Congress Daily, September 27, 2005) and a fictional memorandum written by William J. Olson and Alan Woll with the law firm of William J. Olson, P.C., McLean, VA. entitled: Memorandum for the President, Subject: Presidential Powers To Use the U.S. Armed Forces To Control Potential Civilian Disturbances, May 1, 1999.

~ John Walsh